RICHARD T. ELY LECTURE

International Financial Crises: Causes, Prevention, and Cures
Dale Jorgenson has bestowed a great honor and no small challenge by inviting me to give this lecture: a great honor because of the distinguished list of economists who have preceded me; a challenge because of the standard they have set, and because there is no greater challenge for any economist than providing a coherent account of significant events to his scientific peers.
I am sometimes asked by friends about the differences between academic life and life as a public official. There are many. Two stand out. First, as an academic, the gravest sin one can commit is to sign one's name to something one did not write. As a public official it is a mark of effectiveness to do so as often as possible. Second, as an academic, if a problem is too hard and does not admit of a satisfactory solution, there is an obvious response: work on a different problem. That is not a luxury that one has in government.
I have been reminded of this often in recent years as we have grappled with financial crises in a number of what had previously been considered emerging markets with unrestrained futures. Anyone who doubts the social importance of what economists do should consider the debates surrounding these crises. Hundreds of millions of people who expected rapidly rising standards of living have seen their living, standards fall; hundreds of thousands if not millions of children have been forced to drop out of school and go to work; hundreds of billions of * U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, DC 20005. This lecture reflects many things I have learned from experiences I have shared with colleagues in the United States government and govemments around the world. I thank Brad DeLong, Marty Feldstein, Stephanie Flanders, Ken Rogoff, Andrei Shleifer, and Ted Truman for useful comments and suggestions. I am especially grateful to Nouriel Roubini and Stephanie Flanders for valuable discussions and assistance in the preparation of this lecture. The usual disclaimer applies. dollars of apparent wealth has been lost; the stability of large nations as nations has been called into question; and the United States has made its largest nonmilitary foreign-policyrelated financial commitmt:nts since the Marshall Plan.
Almost all the issues involved in understanding, preventing, and mitigating these crises are the stuff of economics courses and research: fixed versus flexible exchange rates, moral hazard and multiple equilibria, speculation and liquidity, fiscal and monetary policies, regulation and competition. What economists think, say, and do has profound implications for the lives of literally billions of their fellow citizens. Whether it is discussing the role of derivatives in signaling exchange-;ate commitments with Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, or discussing an NBER working paper on inflation targeting with the Brazilian central bank governor Arminio Fraga, or discussing alternative approaches to bankruptcy law with Indonesia's economic team, or optimal debt durations with the Mexican authorities, I am consistently struck by the impact of the kind of research discussed at the AEA meetings.
The future well-being of the world's people in large part will depend on how the ongoing process of global integration works out. This is a strong statement, but one that is supported by the global economy's post-World War I failure and its post-World War II success. Central to global integration is financial integration: the flow of funds and of capital across international borders. And as the events of the late 1920's and early 1930's remind us, central to global disintegration can be international financial breakdowns.
Today, I want to reflect on the issue of global financial integration in light of the dramatic and largely unpredicted events of recent years. It is perhaps a good time for reflection: there has been enough repair that priority can shift from immediate crisis management, but the crises are sufficiently recent that the sense of urgency that they create to improve the system has not been lost.
1 shall address four issues:
(i) what it means to have an efficient financial system, highlighting the important fact that accident prevention is only one aspect of how that system performs; (ii) the alternate sources of financial crises in general, and roots of the recent crises in particular; (iii) the best ways to design a system, both at the national and the international level, that will work well and more effectively prevent crises; (iv) the question of effective crisis response, again, both at the level of national policies and the response of the international community.
I. The Goal of an Efficient Global Financial System
Receet years have witnessed a sea change in the global financial system, as the flow of private capital from industrial to developing countries has rnushroomed from $174 billion in the 1980's to $1.3 trillion during the 1990's. In 1990, one emerging-market economy issued sovereign Eurobonds. By 1998, 40 or so emerging-market economies had i5-sued them over the course of the 1990's. And the incidence of major financial accidents has risen sharply, to the point where in the fall of 1998 we experienced what many regarded as the worst financial crisis of the last 50 years following Russia's default, leading many to question the premise that an integrated global financial system is desirable.
The question is an important and a fair one. But it can be answered. There is much about a market economy that we take for granted. One of the more remarkable aspects is the worlc of a well-functioning financial system. On the one side there are consumers who want to set aside resources to prepare for their retirement, or to prepare for a rainy day, or to accumulate resources to purchase a car but who have essentially no productive opportunities for investment. On the other side there are those with opportunities to use resources today to produce more resources tomorrow by investing in equipanent, structures, or schooling, or to permit coui.-sumers to snlooth their consumption streams. It is the task of the financial system to bring the wants and the opportunities together.
When this is done better, a number of benefits result. An economy grows because investments earn higher returns. Scarce capital is put to its best use. Consumers benefit from more future consumption in return for consumption opportunities forgone. Risks are better shared, and individuals face less vela.-tility in the amounts they are able to consume. These are real and tangible benefits, and so it is appropriate that financial systems absorb real resources.
As is now widely understood, the abstract argument for a competitive financial system parallels the argument for competitive markets in general. As the textbooks teach, the appro-. priate rates of substitution and transformation are equated. Intermediation activity will be profitable when it is efficient; that is, when the gains generated outweigh the costs of the activity. Thus, for example, specialists who provide liquidity to a rnarlcet will earn profits that reflect the benefit they are bringing buyers and sellers, just as those who transport goods between highand low--price regions can earn revenues that reflect the benefits they are providing.
In the United States economy today, 7 percent of GNP is devoted to financial intennedi ation, more than double the share 40 years ago. And this takes no account of the large effort within nonfinancial corporations that is devoted to raising and allocating capital. It is tempting but. 1have become convinced, wrong to think of all this intermediation activity as deadweight loss efforts to win zero-sum games.' While there may be some elements of this kind of thing, the larger point is this: even small increases in tlre efficiency with which capital is allocated have enorrnous social benefits. If a typical economy has a capital output ratio of This conclusion ref ecfs evolution in my thinking. Summers and Victoria P. Summers (1989) takes a rather dimmer view of the financial system. While the arguments made there regarding elements of rent-seeking still seem valid, the cliscussion there did not do justice to the benefits that liquid markets provide.
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3:1, it follows that an increase in the efficiency with which capital is allocated of 2 percent or roughly 20 basis points has a social benefit equivalent to that of 6 percent of GIVP in forgone consumption.
What does all this have to do with the international financial system or with international financial crises? The implication is that, insofar as international financial integration represents an improvement in financial intermediation (whether because of the transfer of saving from low-to high-return jurisdictions, because of better risk-sharing, or because institutions involved in the transfer of capital across jurisdictions improve the efficiency with which capital is allocated), it offers a potentially significant increase in economic efficiency with benefits both for consumers and for investors around the world. Just as trade in goods across jurisdictions has benefits, so too will intertemporal trade and trade that shares risks across jurisdictions have benefits.
These are not just abstractions. There are a priori reasons to suppose that the gains from intertemporal trade and from trade in financial services have the potential to be very large. Essentially all of the growth in the world's labor force over the next few decades will take place in the developing world, as the industrialized world ages. Yet most of the world's saving will take place in industrialized countries. And the abundant evidence of unutilized steel mills and what Federal Reserve Chaisman Alan Greenspan has called "conspicuous construction" speaks to the potential for improved systems of intermediation to allocate capital more efficiently within developing countries, as well as between the developed and the developing world.
Some, notably Jagdish Bhagwati (1"38)), have taken the position that these benefits apply only to long-term direct investment. But while, as I will discuss, there are certainly dangers from creating excessive biases in favor of financial flows, one should remember that in the right kind of environment financial flows can also provide important benefits. First, they are the outcome of transactions that finance real trade and related financial transactions and provide cross-border liquidity to the interbank market. Second, they provide capital to local businesses on what are often the best available terms.
Third, they are closely associated with the presence of foreign businesses and foreign financial institutions, which themselves bring significant benefits. More generally, generic attempts to distinguish between good (direct) and bad (financial) capital flows remind me of attempts to distinguish between good and bad imports of goods and services in int~:rnational trade-and may prove equally counterproductive. While all that potential is certainly there, words like "moral hazard," "adverse selection," ''noise trading," and "herding" remind us that economic theory has identified many reasons why financial markets do not always perform perfectly. And the centuries-long history of financial crises teaches us no less clearly that the flows of capital driven by financial markets can be very different from an efficient and optimal allocation of savings to the right investment projects.
How best to think about financial innovation? An analogy may be helpful. The jet airplane made air travel more comfortable, more efficient, and more safe, though the accidents were more spectacular and for a time more numerous after the iet was invented. In the same way, modern global financial markets carry with them enormous potential for benefit. even if some of fhe accidents are that much more spectacular. As the right public policy response to the jet was longer runways, better air-traffic control, and better training for pilots, and not the discouragement of rapid travel, so the right public policy response to financial innovation is to assure a safe framework so that the benefits can be realized, not to stifle the change.
That said, the deve'lopment of a proper air transport system also depended on understanding and addressing the reasons for crashes. In the same way, the development of the right kind of international financial system will depend on understanding the causes of crises, a topic to which I now turn.
Understanding International Financial Crises
L,eo Tolstoy famously observed that "every happy family is the same. Every unhappy family is miserable in its own way." Every financial crisis is different and involves its own distinctive elements. There are, however, some adjust exchange rates although, as we shall. see, devaluations can frequently presage international financial crises.
If we are to prevent accidents as effectively as possible, and mitigate them where we cannot prevent them, it is important to understand how they happen and the nature of their antecedents. There have been six major international financial crises during the 1990's: Mexico in 1995; Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea in 1997-1998; Russia in 1998; and Brazil in 1998-1999 . Table 1 provides some information on these crises. Elements in common include a dramatic swing in the current account, a large real depreciation, and a significant decline in real output. With some differences between cases, the pattern in all these crises. and indeed. a number of crises historically, appears to involve three broad elements.
First, after a period of substantial capital inflows, investors (both domestic and foreign) decided to reduce the stock of their assets in the affected country in response to a change in its fundamentals. This can have manv sources: concern about the viability of the exchange-rate regime, as in most of these cases; concern about large fiscal deficits, as in Russia and Brazil; concern about large current-account deficits, as in Thailand and Brazil; and the increasing salience of long-standing financial-sector weaknesses, arising from some combination of insufficient capitalization and supervision of banks and excessive leverage and guaranteethe combination that, along with directed lending, has been captured in the term "crony ~a~i t a l i s m . "~ Second, after this process went on for some time in these emerging-market countries, investors shifted their focus from evaluating the situation in the country to evaluating the behavior of other investors. The rate of withdrawal increased as a bank-run psychology took hold, and investors sought to avoid being the last ones in as they saw the country's reserves being See Ronald McKinnon and Huw Pill (1996) , Morris Goldstein (1998) . Paul Krugman (1998) , Giancarlo Corsetti et al. (1999a, b) , and Council of Economic Advisers (1999) for analyses stressing the role of fundamentals and distortions created by guarantees and weaknesses in the financial sector.
d e~l e t e d .This was manifested in the shift of the mode of investment analysis from economics to hydraulics, with an accountings~readsheet exercise that made no reference to prices on the sources and uses of funds. Rumors of drastic action (a moratorium, capital controls, or some such) began to circulate, and a panic mentality developed. This phenomenon was particularly evident in Mexico in early 1995 and in South Korea between Thanksgiving and Christmas in 1997, and it seems a particularly pervasive feature of recent emerging-market crises. No one, after all, raised questions about debt rollover in the United Kingdom following sterling's exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992, or in continental Europe after the breakdown of the ERM in 1993.
Third, the withdrawal of capital and the associated sharp swing in the exchange rate and reduced access to ca~ital exacerbated fundamental weakness, in tun1 exacerbating the financial-market response. The real depreciation of the exchange rate reduced real incomes and spending. Extrapolative: expectations regarding a falling exchange rate increased pressure for capital flight. And, most importantly, the increased domestic value of foreign-currency liabilities and reduced creditworthiness of domestic borrowers further degraded an already ailing financial system, in turn causing further reductions in lending and worsening of the fundamentals?
The role of bank runslpanic and an interpretation of the crisis in terms of an international liquidity crisis has been stressed by Guillermo Calvo (1998) , Roberto Chang and hndres Velasco (1998 Velasco ( , 1999 , Jeffrey Steven Radelet (1998, 1999) , and Dani Rodrik and Velasco (1999) .
See Philippe Aghion et al. (1999) and Krugman (1999) for formal models of such balance-sheet effects. These effects may also help to explain why currency crises are often associated with financialbanking crises, a phenomenon referred to as "twin crises " Indeed, in five out of the six i~~ternational financial crises considered in this paper, currency crises were associated with banking crises. However, the interaction between currency and banking crises is complex. While balance-sheet effects may explain why currency crises lead to banking crises, evidence also suggests that, at times, banking crises precede currency crises and are an early warning signal of future currency crises. The analytical and empirical complex interactions between banking and currency crises have been recently studied by a number In order to understand the economics of the crises we have seen. each of these three critical elements is essential. Without a change in sentiment, driven by a weakening in the economic fundamentals, it is not possible to account for decisions to withdraw capital. Without the bank-run psychology, it is not possible to account for the scale of the change in investors' allocation decisions. which seem so discontinuous with respect to any easily observable aspects of fundamentals. Without reference to the strains on domestic financial systems and corporate firms, it is hard to account for the magnitude of the observed declines in economic performance and the failure of real exchangi-rate depreciations to trigger large immediate increases in exports in a number of cases.
Another feature of the 1990's episodes of turmoil is the presence of international "contagion," seen in the ERM crisis of 1992-1993, the 'Yequila" effects of the Mexican peso crisis of 1994---1995, the "yellow fever" effects of the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, and the asset-market contagion following the Russian devaluation and default in August 1998 and the Brazilian devaluation in January 1999.
There are many explanations and models of ~o n t a g i o n :~ (i) It can be due to common shocks (like terns of primary commodity price shocks) that simultaneously hurt the commodityexporting countries. Corsetti et al. (1999b) , Goldstein et al. (1999) , and Graciella Kaminsky and Carmen Re~nhart (1999 cult to point to any emerging-market economy that experienced a financial crisis but did not have significant fundamental weaknesses that called into question the sustainabili1.y of its policies. Yet it seems equally difficult to avoid the judgment that, in many of these recent cases, the punishment was in a sense disproportionate to the crime, with the process of capital withdrawal greatly exacerbating any underlying weakness. A crude but simple game, related to Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig's (1983) celebrated analysis of bank runs, illustrates some of the issues involved here. Imagine that everyone who has invested $10 with me can expect to earn $1, assuming that I stay solvent. Suppose that if I go bankrupt, investors who remain lose their whole $10 investment, but that an investor who withdraws today neither gains nor loses. What would you do? Each individual judgment would presumably depend on one's assessment of my prospects, but this in turn depends on the collective judgment of all of the investors.
Suppose, first, that my foreign reserves, ability to mobilize resources, and economic strength are so limited that if any investor withdraws I will go bankrupt. It would be a Nash equilibrium (indeed, a Pareto-dominant one) for everyone to remain, but (I expect) not an attainable one. Someone would reason that someone else would decide to be cautious and withdraw, or at least that someone would reason that someone would reason that someone would withdraw, and so forth. This phenomenon, which Douglas Hofstadter has labeled "reverberant doubt," would likely lead to large-scale withdrawals, and I would go bankrupt. It would not be a close-run thing. John Maynard Keynes's beauty contest captures a similar idea. Now suppose that my fundamental situation were such that everyone would be paid off as long as no more than one-third of the investors chose to withdraw. What would you do then? Again, there are multiple equilibria: everyone should stay if everyone else does, and everyone should pull out if everyone else does, but the more favorable equilibria seems much more robust.
I think that this thought experiment captures something real. On the one hand, bank runs or their international analogues do happen. On the other hand, they are not driven by sunspots: their likelihood is driven and determined by the exrent of fundamental weaknesses. These questions of equilibrium selection can be and indeed have been more formally a n a l y~e d .~ my the For purposes, point is that preventing crises is heavily an issue of avoiding situations where the bankrun psychology takes holld, and that will depend heavily on strengthening core institutions and other fundamentals.
Crisis Prevention at the National and International Level
A. National Crisis-Prevention Eforts
Many countries experience major shocks-to their terns of trade, to investor confidence, or within their domestic financial systems. Relatively few of them have major financial crises. Why? Table 2 provides subjective ratings of the importance of various factors as antecedents to the six major emerging -market financial crises of the 1990's.
Four primary conclusions emerge:
(i) In nearly all the cases, serious banking and financial-sector weaknesses played an important role. (ii) Fixed exchange rates without the concomitant monetary-policy commitments were present as antecedenls to crisis in all the cases. (iii) Traditional macroeconomic fundamentals, in the form of' overly inflationary monetary policies, large fiscal deficits, or even large current accouint deficits, were present in several cases but are not necessary antecedents to crisis in all episodes.
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin (1998) provide a novel analysis of how weak fundamentals, uncertainty of the type I discussed in Hofstadter's "wolf's dilemma" game, and private information in a standard multiple-equilibrium model can produce a unique equilibrium. This work suggests the fragility of many multiple-equilibria results and the crucial role of fundamental weaknesses. The challenge is now to model these phenomena in more realistic dynamic settings. (iv) National balance-sheet weaknesses, including large short-term liabilities either of government or the private sector, were important elements in each of the crises.
A substantial literature has sought more systematically to analyze the antecedents and non-antecedents of financial crises with broadly similar conclusions to my crude table.'' These four observations, in turn, help identify the four elements of an effective national strategy for minimizing the risk of this kind of crisis.
First, and easier said than done, is maintaining a strong domestic financial system. While many authors emphasize vulnerability measures comparing the level of foreign reserves to l o There is a vast econometric literature on the causes of recent crises and early-warning indicators of future crises. Recent contributions include Jeffrey Frankel and Rose (1996) , Sachs et al. (1996) , Andrew Berg and Catherine Pattillo (1998), Goldstein et al. (1999) , Sachs and Radelet (1999) , and Corsetti et al. (1999~) . measures of short-term liabilities, the work of Simon Johnson ee al. (2000) is particularly persuasive in highlighting the strength of domestic financial systems and institutions. When well capitalized and supervised banks, effective corporate governance and bankruptcy codes, and credible means of contract enforcement, along with other elements of a strong financial system. are present, significant amounts of debt will be sustainable. In their absence, even very small amounts of debt can be problematic.
The second element is the choice of appropriate exchange-rate regime, which, for economies with access to international capita? markets, increasingly means a move away from the middle ground of pegged but adjust-. able fixed exchange rates toward the two cor.~ ner regimes of either flexible exchange rates or a fixed exchange rate supported, if necessary, by a commitment to give up altogether an independent monetary policy. The practical choice between these two poles, for emerging-market economies today, probably has less to do with Robert Mundel19s 1:raditional optimal-currency-area considerations than with a country's capacity to operate a discretionary monetary policy in a way that will reduce rather than increase variance in economic output.
Third. a sound and stable macroeconomic policy environment is needed where monetary-policy and fiscal-policy vulnerabilities are minimized, including especially the avoidance of fiscal deficits that are substantially beyond a country's sustainable dornestic financing capacity. What this deficit level will be will depend on a country's savings behavior and the quality of its capital markets.
Fourth, countries should reduce their vulnerabilities to liquidity/rollover risk and balance-sheet risk. Foreign reserves need to be compared to n~eaningfill measures of liabilities that can become a claim against a country's reserves; traditional ratios of reserve to imports are thus of little use. Also, policy biases toward short-term capital need to be avoided.
This last point deserves emphasis because we have seen this kind of bias time and time again in the recent crises: (i) We saw it in Mexico, with the increasing resort to issuing dollar-denominated Tesobonos in the lead-up to crisis. (ii) We saw it in Thailand, in the tax breaks on offshore foreign borrowing and the government's decision to mortgage all of its reserves on forward markets. (iii) We saw it in South Korea, where discriminatory controls kept long-term capital out and ushered short-term capital in. (iv) And we saw it in Russia, in the government's determined efforts to attract international investors to the market for subledenominated GKO's.
In this context the question naturally arises of controls on short-term capital inflows; as a crisis-avoidance measure. Rut the firsl. and usually neglected point is that, just as economists usually recommend that efforts to reduce energy consumption should start with the elimination of energy subsidies rather than the introduction of new energy taxes. so the first priority with regard to capital flows must be to do no harm: that is, to avoid policies that reach excessively for short-term capital, such as those we have seen in recent crisis economies.
A measure of sound management of shortterm flows is implicit in any prudential regulation of banks. Where controls are in place it is a mistake to be theological about their removal; but experience suggests that such controls tend to become more ineffective over time, create their own costs and distortions, and discourage the integration of financial :;ervices that can be an important source of stability. They are no panacea and indeed can degrade the performance of the very functions of the financial system described in Section I.
Still, policy biases that lead to an excessive accumulation of short-term debt should be addressed via policy changes that eliminate such biases, including: the distoi-lions that can result from restrictions on foreign direct investment, inward equity portfolio investment, or the access of nonresidents to long--term bond markets: or policy distortions and tax incentives that can lead to an excessive reliance on debt relative to equity finance. Of course, underdeveloped capital markets, where long-term fornis of finance (i.e., equity, long-term bonds) are not widely available, will themselves create a bias in favor of short-term capital flows in the right environment. When we consider the recognized role that efficient capital markets can play in providing finance for long-term growth, it is clear that their tlevelopment should be given high priority in the process of domestic and international capital-market liberalization.
Just as better airplane:; arid airports are good in ways that go beyond accident-prevention, all of these steps are valuable not simply as crisis prevention measures, but in their own right, as proven strategies for promoting economic efficiency and growth.
Ultimately, the likelil~ood of plane crashes depends on the training and judgment of pilots and sound manufacture of planes. Rut the system in which pilots operate will equally be important and demands careful consideration. The satne applies to the international dimension of crisis prevention.
The overwhelming coi~tribution that the international community can make toward preventing crises is to succeed in encouraging sound national economic policies. And the most important thing that the international community can do in achieving this goal is to promote transparency.
If one were writing a history of the American capital market, 1think one would conclude that the single most important innovation shaping that market was the idea of generally accepted accounting principles. The transparency i mplicit in the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) promotes efficient market responses to change, and it supports stability. Furthermore, if as Ken Galbraith has observed, conscience is the fear that someone may be watching, it may be the single most effective means of promoting self-regulation. Very much the same kind of transparency is nceded in the emerging economies.
There is also an important role for better international survcillance of thc quality of national policies in the areas just described. This is a role that is increasingly being taken on by the IMF in a broader range of areas, as it moves away from the time when it could be said that IMF stood for "It's Mostly Fiscal."" International forums such as the 4;-7, the new G-20, the APEC finance ministers, and so forth can also be helpful. Indeed, their major accomplishment is not the specific decisions that are taken when they meetsometimes there are none. Rather, it is the gradual spread of common ways of thinking about and responding to economic developments. The value of the diffusion of best practice, or at least, better practice, is not to be discounted. Over time these forums provide important opportunities to use political pressure to nudge national policies in the right direction.
Beyond the approbation of their peers, the question does arise as to what will motivate countries to pursue stronger policies. The basic answer has to be self-interest. The ultimate reward for countries with improved policies will be better economic outcomes and a higher stalldard of living for their citizens. The proximate and more irnrnediate indicator and incentive can " See my speech on IMF reform (Summers, 1999) for an elaboration of these ideas.
be the lower borrowing costs that come froxn being well-regarded by the market.
There are some who suggest that systematic augmentation of countries' foreign reserves, through the availability of generalized, uncooditional emergency finance, would make acci dents less likely by reducing the risk of the kind of self-fulfilling expectations-driven crises that I have discussed. While conditioned, precalxtionary financial suppost is constructive in sonm: cases, the risk inherent in systematic availability of unconditional credit to countries can be sum" marized in two words: moral hazard. Crises are typically preceded by significant depletion c~C reserves. There is the real prospect that auto matic availability of reserves would simply delay necessary adjustments and thereby prove highly destructive.
While the best preventive policies would nrainimize the chance that crises would occur., they would never eliminate them entirely. When they do occur, it will be important to follow policies that minimize their virulence and ~0 1 1 -sequences.
BV. Natioillal and Fnterrnatiosaal Crisis Resporase
Crisis response, like crisis prevention, bas two dimensions: national policies that can re store confidence and international efforts io li nance a credible path out of crises. Of thesc, by the far the most important is the response oi national authorities in the countries concerncd. If there is one lesson that has been broughi home most forcefully by the events of recent years, it is that countries shape their own desri.. nies-and the international community can never want sound policies or economic stabili'ty more than the government and people of the country itself.
A. Bfieetirse Crisis Response at the National Level
The best national response to crisis is not to have one. The next best is to have a sufficiently robust set of domestic institutions and national economic system that the crisis is contaiilecl and self-limiting and does not reach the stage wherc a country's capacity lo meet its international obligations comes into question. This goes back to questions of crisis-prevention. Here I am talking about full-blown crises of the kind suggested by the six examples we have seen in the 1990's.
In my experience, policymakers in a country facing such a crisis tend to go through stages reminiscent of the five stages of grief. First, there is the denial that a crisis could be taking place. Second, we see anger, with a rush to blame speculators and other outside forces, and often, domestically, a change in government. Third, there is the bargaining: the desperate search for magic bullets that we saw, for example, in the pressure for a currency board in the depth of the crisis in Indonesia. Fourth comes despair, leading eventually to the decision to call in the IMF. Finally, in the fifth stage, there is acceptance and the agreement of a credible plan,
As an academic I used to be impatient with the seemingly mundane advice of former officials and worldly sorts who counseled the victims of financial crisis to comrnunicate with their creditors, get the bad news out early, take decisive steps early to resolve a crisis, and so forth. More recently, I have come to appreciate more keenly that propositions become clichCs because they capture truth. In situations where confidence is central, it is a mistake to think that it is only the substance of what national authorities do that matters.
Perhaps the best advice that I have heard about the right policy following a crisis is President Ernesto Zedillo's admonition, based on his experience leading Mexico out of crisis in 1995, that markets overreact, so policy needs to overreact as well.
All of this speaks to the form of an effective policy response to crises. What about its content? It will vary from case to case. But experience suggests some important lessons: (i) Providing confidence to markets and investors that a credible path out of crisis exists and will be followed is essential. That requires transparency (providing all relevant information to markets so that risk-averse investors are not uncertain about how deep and serious problems are), consistent and credible commitment to a coherent policy-adjustment package (so that political and policy uncertainty does not undermine investors' confidence), and close consultation with creditors (so that sudden negative policy and informational surprises are minimized, and so that creditors are reassured that cooperative approaches to debt servicing difficulties will be pursued). (ii) If' lax fiscal policy is a contributor to the crisis, then tightening will be a key part of restoring confidence, but in a situation in which large-scale outflows of capital are likely to have their own contractionary effect, it is neither necessary nor desirable to tighten fiscal policy solely in response to the crisis itself. Indeed, since devaluation may be deflationary in the short run (through its expenditure reduction effects) rather than expansionary (via the expenditure switching effect that kicks in the medium run), less stress may have to be put on other forms of expenditure-reduction in the adjustment process (i.e., fiscal contraction) when these are not warranted based on fundamentals. And, in fact, fiscal policy was allowed to loosen in several Asian crisis economies when the depth of the recession emerged in early 1998. (iii) Countries need to ser the right monetary policy to establish confidence, and in a situation in which a currency is in free-fall it is difficult to believe that the way to restore stability is to produce more of that currency. The right monetary policy at times of crisis has to be one that will minimize the average interest rate over the medium term; and where confidence is at issue, that may imply a significant tightening in the short run. Given the free fall of currencies (and ensuing exacerbation of contractionary balance-sheet effects) in cases such as Indonesia, where monetary conditions were kept lax at the onset of the crisis, the argument that lower interest rates early on would have strengthened currencies seems neither convincing nor supported by the evidence. Indeed, currencies stabilized and recovered in Asiancrisis economies afier a perrod of tight money restored confidence in early 1998, paving the way for a rapid and significant reduction in interest rates in the second part of the year.
(iv) Prompt action needs to be taken to maintain financial stability, by moving quickly to support: healthy institutions and by intervening in unhealthy institutions. The loss of confidence in the financial system and episodes of bank panics were not caused by early and necessary interven-. tions in insolvent institutions. Rather, these problems were exacerbated by (a) a delay in intervening to address the problem of n~obanting nonperfonning loans; (b) implicit bailout guarantees that led to an at-. tetnpt to ""gamble for redemption"; (c) a system of implicit. rather than explicit and incentive-compatible, deposit guarantees at a time when there was not a credible ainount of fiscal resources available to back such guarantees; and (d) political distortions and interferences in the way interventions were carried out (as when an Indonesian bank owned by a son of Presi-. dent Soehareo w7as closed one day only to be reopened the next, under a different name in the same premises). (v) Strong and effective social safeguards need to be in place. Effective social policy and spending can ease the task of adjustnlent during times of crisis, help build support for necessary reforms, and ensure that the burden of adjustment does not fall disproportioi~ately on the poorest and most vulnerable groups in society. This is a moral imperative. It can also be a political imperative if strong adjustment policies are to be sustained. Countries need to own the adjustment program, and governments have to be democratic and have popular support for policies that are painful in the short run but necessary to restore growth in a rapid manner. Indeed, in several Asian countries (Thailand, South Korea. and Indonesia), the process of confidence-restoration and asset-price recovery was associated with the rise to power of new governments that had greater political legitimacy and popular suppo1t.
Clearly, in all of these judgments there will be difficult issues of balance, and we can never guarantee that they will be made cor rectly in every cask. But there can be no question (and there has not been any question) that the goal is to restore confidence and stability as rapidly as possible and so to pave the way for renewed growth.
B. International Crisis l?esPonse1'
As I noted earlier, a hallmarl< of crisis nn its most vil-ulent phase is that a country's creditors come to focus on hydraulics, not economics, looking to see whether there are adequate resources to finance all obligations coming due. Absent this assurance, the restoration of confidence will not be possible.
The central task for the international response to a crisis is the establishment of a path that will see a country and its creditors out of the crisis through a series of mutually consistent and rc inforcing actions. The goal must be the restoration of confidence and the normal flow of private capital.
This goal can be addressed in two broad ways in the context of credible policy adjustment: (i) through the provision of official finance; or (ii) through some coordination of private creditors to reduce outflows or roll over obllgations coming due.
Along with spuning sourld policy in the affected country, the crucial objective of the international community in respondi~lg to crisis is using these two tools to promote the restoration of confidence.
The provision of emergency finance i xn support of credible policy adjustment can, in ' "here are many academic and policy contributions to the debate on the reform of the international financial system aimed at preventing crises from occurring and resolving with minimal costs those that do occur. Such contributions include, but are not limited to, work by the Council on Foreign Relations (1999), Eichengreerl (1999 ), Martin Feldstein (1999 ), and Kennelb Rogoff (1999 . Recently, researchers have also started to develop analytical models of architecture to consider the impli-. cations and effects (sometimes perverse) of a number of policy proposals, such as partial or full internationai lender of last resort, capital controls, rollover options, and temporary suspension of external debt payments. These analytical contributions to the architecture debate include work by Goldfajin and Valdes (1999) , Olivicr Jeanne (1999) , Jeanne and Charles Wyplosz (1999) . and Jeronim Zettelmeyer (1999). principle and in practice, be highly effective in restoring confidence. Unlike in the 1980's when the international financial institutions and bilaterals provided only relatively minor sums to countries in crisis, large-scale provision of emergency finance has been a central part of the international financial community's response to the crises of the 1990's. The approach followed, as embodied in the IMF's Supplemental Resources Facility, has had something in common with Walter Bagehot's dictum of lending freely at penalty rates on collateral that is sound in normal times. While the counterfactual is not available, I believe that the availability of substantial resources has contributed to the relatively rapid recovery from deep crises in countries such as Mexico and South Korea which were successful in carrying out their policy commitments. Korea's economy, for example, is currently growing by around 9 percent.
The provision of conditioned finance at premium rates to respond to crises does raise certain difficulties. First, there is the real question of balancing the desire to apply conditionality to country policies with the desire to add confidence to the market. The former requires uncertainty as to whether resources will be forthcoming; the latter is best served by confidence, so the balance that must be struck in a transparent world where national authorities and the market hear the same message is a complicated one.
Second, there is the issue of moral hazard and the possible systemic implications of the expectations of bailouts. There is considerable debate about the importance of this issue. While many disagree, I think it is hard to make the case that investments in emerging markets have been heavily influenced by the expectation of the availability of official resources for bailouts.
For example, there is no systematic evidence that flows to official creditors rose relative to flows to private creditors following the official response to the Mexican financial crisis. ~urthermore, there is the analytical point that, if official-sector lending into financial crises is judged properly and is paid back at premium interest rates, it can benefit the lenders, creditors, and countries involved and does not impose a taxpayer cost in the same way that deposit insurance does. Indeed, a well-designed official lending facility that is profitable and makes all relevant agents better off is a clear pareto-improvement.13 However, as in the case of an efficient and incentive-compatible deposit-insurance and safety-net scheme, possible moral-hazard distortions induced by automatic guarantees need to be avoided to ensure that the scheme does not lead to systemic losses and distortions. Thus, it is certain that a healthy financial system cannot be built on the expectation of bailouts.
The third question raised by large-scale official lending as a response to crisis is one of feasibility. As capital markel s integrate and capital flows increase, in at least some cases it may well become impossible for official finance to fill gaps entirely or restore confidence.
These considerations lead to private-sector coordination as an alternative response to crisis. Coordination of bank creditors played a crucial role in the resolution of the South Korean financial crisis and a significant role in Brazil. Private-sector jnvolvement as an approach to crisis resolution has the virtues of avoiding the need for public-sector money and of reducing moral hazard. But it too raises difficulties.
There is the question of achieving coordination. Individual creditors have little incentive to cooperate in reschedulings or debt reductions, and ample opportunities to free ride jf approaches based on voluntarism are pursued. At the same time, if approaches based on coercion are pursued, there are real questions of fairness: for example, how should a country's domestic debts be treated? And what about effort!; on the part of local residents to convert domestic into foreign l 3 However, as shown by Neil Wallace (1988) , optimal partial suspension schemes during a bank run may dominate a government lender-of-last-resort (or deposit-insurance) scheme unless the government has superior information about the nature and size of the bank run. This leaves open the issue of whether the creditor-coordination problem that leads to self-fulfilling runs could he addressed via appropriate private-sector involvement (a mechanism lo coordinate creditors' actions and avoid a run or, in the extreme, a debt suspension) rather than via large amounts of official support. This is a most complex issue analytically, and even more so in a policy context. cirxl-ency? There is also the real risk of the des!ruchion of confidence undermining new Mows, either lo the country in q~~e s t i o n or to its rieighbors. For these and other related reasoirs, the question of private-sector involverrrenk in crisis ~,esolution has rightly been treated with some delicacy.
Whai is the right iriix of private-sector involvcrnent and financing in response to crisis? While case-by-case judgmental approaches arc rarely satisfying to analysts, they will, 1 expect, be pursued by the international commiiiii~yfor sorvrc time to come. Cases will difki. in the nature of-' the debts coming due, e11r !ilielihood that they can ultimately be paid, the ease with which creditors can be organized, the magnitude of contagion risks, and the availability of financial resources, to rne~tion just a few factors. For all these reasons, ihe G-7 has rightly laid out principles but :;oi detailed procedures for handling issucs of private-sector involvement.
V, Conclalding Remarks 1 will conclude where 1began. Sound financial systerals can contribute enormously to economic developrxrent around the world, and the flow oT capital across international borders can confer enorralous benefits. And yet as we have seen, there is the potential for massive accisienls.
Some, remembering Jim 'Tobin's admonition, that It talces a heap of Zlarberger triangles to fill an Okun gap, conclude that the game is not worth the candle and so the flow of capital sho~rld systematically be discouraged. I thinli the right lesson is the more optimistic one, that with good sense and hard work, and a great deal of creative thought, the Olcun gaps can be avo,icled, and Ihe gains fron~ capital flows can iranslatc into what is most important for any economy: namely, changes in its long-term growth rate.
I have described here some of the thinking that has guided the international community In responding to the dramatic developments of reccnt years. I do so not in the conviction that we have ail the answers, but in the certainty that the questions are profoundly important. If I have provoked further thought on a set of issues tl~at econonnists are uniquely qualified to address, 1 will have succeeded in my purpose.
